Who Decides the Seat of Arbitration?
Think of the seat of arbitration as the constitutional capital of the arbitral universe—a single latitude-longitude point that silently governs procedure, supervisory jurisdiction, and the legal climate of the entire process. Deciding it is not just administrative; it is destiny-shaping.
Here’s how the decision is typically made:
1. The Parties Themselves — the Ultimate Architects
Under virtually all modern arbitration laws (UNCITRAL Model Law, New York Convention practice, English Arbitration Act, Singapore IAA, etc.),
the parties have the first and highest right to choose the seat.
If the arbitration clause says:
“Seat of arbitration: London,”
—case closed.
Courts and tribunals treat it as sacrosanct.
Even implied choices—like choosing ICC rules + Paris venue—may be interpreted as Paris being the seat, depending on wording and intentions.
Parties’ autonomy is the crown jewel of arbitration.
2. If the Parties Do Not Agree → the Arbitral Institution
Where the agreement is silent or ambiguous, institutional rules normally kick in:
- ICC: Court of Arbitration may fix the seat.
- LCIA: Tribunal may decide, subject to the LCIA Court’s power.
- SIAC: The SIAC Court decides absent party agreement.
- HKIAC: The HKIAC Council has the authority.
Institutions usually pick a seat appropriate for fairness, neutrality, and convenience.
Think of them as the “constitutional caretakers” of arbitration logistics.
3. If There Is Ad Hoc Arbitration → the Arbitral Tribunal Decides
In ad hoc arbitrations (UNCITRAL Rules, party-designed frameworks),
the tribunal decides the seat when parties fail to agree.
Tribunals typically consider:
- neutral and arbitration-friendly jurisdiction
- availability of court support
- enforceability of awards
- convenience of parties and witnesses
- procedural efficiency
They are like navigators choosing the safest legal harbour.
4. In Rare Cases-the Courts Intervene
If:
- the clause is pathological
- the parties’ intention is irretrievably unclear
- the tribunal chooses an unreasonable seat
- public policy demands correction
Courts may step in and determine the seat.
Courts act as the emergency architects-not the designers, but the protectors of structural integrity.
In One Perfect Line
The seat of arbitration is decided first by the parties; failing that, by the institution (in institutional arbitration) or the tribunal (in ad hoc cases), with courts acting only as a last-resort guardian.
1. Comparative table – who decides the seat?
| Jurisdiction | Primary decision-maker(s) on seat | Statutory basis | If parties don’t agree | Courts’ role when seat is unclear | Illustrative authorities |
| UK (England & Wales) | 1. Parties expressly in arbitration agreement or by incorporating institutional rules. 2. Arbitral institution/third party if authorised. 3. Tribunal as default. | Arbitration Act 1996, s 3 (as retained under the 2025 reforms). | Tribunal determines the seat “having regard to the parties’ agreement and all the relevant circumstances” (paraphrasing s 3). | High Court / UKSC determine seat by interpreting the arbitration agreement, especially where only a “venue” is named, or where seat is needed to decide curial law or jurisdiction (e.g. anti-suit relief, set-aside). | Shashoua v Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm) (London designated as seat where clause referred to “arbitration in London” with ICC rules). Enka v Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 (seat and law of arbitration agreement). |
| Singapore | 1. Parties (seat clause or institutional rules, usually SIAC). 2. Tribunal under Model Law (as incorporated). | International Arbitration Act 1994 (Cap 143A) Sch 1 (UNCITRAL Model Law), Art 20; SIAC Rules 2016 & 2025. | Under Model Law Art 20(1), where no agreement, the tribunal fixes the place of arbitration having regard to the circumstances, including convenience of parties. | Singapore courts determine the seat where the clause is ambiguous (e.g. references to “arbitration in X”) and to decide if Singapore is the proper curial forum or whether the arbitration agreement is valid. | BNA v BNB [2019] SGCA 84 (phrase “arbitration in Shanghai” held to designate Shanghai as the juridical seat, not Singapore). |
| UAE (onshore; DIFC/ADGM are similar but separate) | 1. Parties agree seat (which may be “real” or “virtual”). 2. Tribunal if no agreement. | Federal Law No 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, art 28. | Art 28 provides that if the parties do not agree, the tribunal determines the seat, having regard to the circumstances and convenience. | Onshore courts (or DIFC/ADGM courts where those are chosen as seats) may interpret whether a reference to “Dubai” etc is a seat or only a venue, and which curial law/court has supervisory jurisdiction. | DIFC cases such as Ledger v Leeor ARB-016/2022 and Narciso v Nash ARB-009/2024 clarify the distinction between “Dubai” as geographical place and DIFC as juridical seat and supervisory court. Commentary explains how DIFC has treated “seat” vs “venue” in earlier decisions. |
| Qatar (onshore) | 1. Parties agree place of arbitration. 2. Tribunal if no agreement. | Law No 2 of 2017 Promulgating the Civil and Commercial Arbitration Law, esp. art 20 (parties may agree a place inside or outside Qatar; absent agreement, tribunal fixes the place). |
“Determining the Seat of Arbitration: Comparative Lessons, Challenges, and Reform Directions”
1. Opening Remarks
Esteemed colleagues, distinguished panelists, and participants—
The concept of the seat of arbitration is not a mere administrative formality. It is the constitutional spine of the arbitral process—the element that determines procedural law, court supervision, enforceability, and ultimately the success or fragility of the entire dispute-resolution ecosystem.
Today, I want to unpack three things:
- How leading jurisdictions—UK, Singapore, UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—determine the seat
- What challenges persist in practice
- What reforms are necessary to align global and regional arbitration systems with modern expectations
2. Comparative Insights: A Rapid Tour of Five Jurisdictions
United Kingdom
- Party autonomy is absolute king.
- Courts intervene only to clarify ambiguity, not to rewrite agreements.
- Cases like Shashoua v Sharma and Enka v Chubb illustrate the judicial preference for certainty and predictability.
Lesson:
Clear drafting + strong judiciary = reliability.
Singapore
- Model Law–driven; tribunal decides seat if parties remain silent.
- Landmark case BNA v BNB reaffirmed the distinction between seat and venue.
- Singapore remains the gold standard in judicial deference and institutional clarity.
Lesson:
Precision in interpretation + robust institutions = global trust.
United Arab Emirates (Onshore + DIFC/ADGM)
- Federal Arbitration Law 2018 modernized UAE arbitration.
- DIFC and ADGM function as autonomous common-law islands with strong pro-arbitration courts.
- Recent DIFC cases clarify that “Dubai” (geographical place) ≠ “DIFC” (juridical seat).
Lesson:
Dual systems bring flexibility—but also potential confusion for uninformed parties.
Qatar
- Based on UNCITRAL Model Law; tribunal fixes seat if parties do not.
- Courts maintain residual supervision but increasingly respect party choices.
Lesson:
Model Law alignment increases predictability.
Saudi Arabia
- The 2023 Arbitration Law and Draft Arbitration Law 2025 represent a major leap forward.
- SCCA now plays an ICC-style institutional role.
- Party autonomy is central, but tribunals/institutions fill the gaps.
Lesson:
Saudi Arabia is moving from state-centric arbitration to internationally credible arbitration governance.
3. Key Challenges: What Still Goes Wrong?
Despite this progress, several persistent challenges remain:
1. Ambiguous or Pathological Arbitration Clauses
Phrases like:
- “Arbitration in Dubai”
- “Arbitration under ICC Rules, venue Doha”
- “Place: Riyadh, seat to be mutually agreed”
These generate litigation before arbitration even begins.
Impact: Delay, cost, loss of certainty.
2. Confusion Between “Seat” and “Venue”
Even global corporations frequently confuse:
- Venue = physical place
- Seat = juridical home
This misunderstanding fuels jurisdictional battles.
3. Multiplicity of Arbitration Laws Within Single Countries
Examples:
- UAE (Onshore vs. DIFC vs. ADGM)
- KSA (transitional vs. new emerging frameworks)
Impact: Parties are unsure which courts would supervise the arbitration.
4. Judicial Intervention that is Not Always Harmonised
Some courts still take broad interpretations of “public policy,” especially in enforcement actions.
Impact: Awards become vulnerable.
5. Limited Capacity-Building Among Lawyers Drafting Arbitration Agreements
Arbitration clauses are often:
- copied from outdated templates
- lifted from foreign contracts
- drafted without contextual understanding
Impact: Drafting fragility → procedural crisis.
4. Reform Agenda: What Should Change?
Your talk should now turn visionary—proposing reforms that elevate regional arbitration to international standards.
Reform 1: Mandatory “Seat Clause” in Commercial Contracts
In GCC, Pakistan, and similar jurisdictions, regulators or leading chambers should require:
“Seat of Arbitration”
Just as governing law clauses became standard, seat clauses must become unavoidable.
Reform 2: Judicial Training on Arbitration Doctrines
Courts supervising arbitration must have expertise in:
- Model Law principles
- public-policy limits
- separability and kompetenz-kompetenz
- distinction between seat and venue
Result: Less unpredictability; more global confidence.
Reform 3: Institutions Must Publish Clear Seat-Determination Rules
SCCA, DIAC, QICCA, BCDR, and regional centres should:
- adopt SIAC-style clarity
- define when the institution fixes the seat
- outline criteria (neutrality, convenience, enforceability)
Reform 4: Promote “Arbitration-Friendly” Curial Courts
A specialised commercial division or arbitration bench should handle:
- interim relief
- enforcement
- challenges
- jurisdictional questions
This dramatically reduces unpredictability—as Singapore and London have proven.
Reform 5: Standardised Model Clauses for Regional Compatibility
Cross-border contracts in GCC and South Asia should adopt model clauses specifying:
- seat
- governing law
- institution
- language
- arbitrator qualifications
A unified template avoids 70% of post-dispute confusion.
Reform 6: Awareness Campaign for Corporate Counsel
Institutions and bar associations ought to:
- publish checklists
- run clause-drafting workshops
- create online contract-review tools
- certify “arbitration-savvy” corporate departments
5. Panel Discussion Talking Points (Short, Strong, and Memorable)
Use these as your quick interventions during discussion:
“The seat decides the soul of the arbitration.”
“Clarity in drafting prevents years of litigation.”
“Courts must be interpreters, not architects, of arbitration clauses.”
“Regional reforms must prioritise autonomy, neutrality, and enforceability.”
“Arbitration thrives when legal ecosystems avoid unpredictability.”
6. Closing Note
In the final minute, conclude with authority:
“If arbitration is to retain the trust of international commerce, the determination of the seat must be treated not as a procedural accident but as a constitutional choice. Our region’s future—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Pakistan—depends on coherence, clarity, and confidence. The seat is not geography. It is governance.”
SOME IMPORTANT QUSTIONS AND ANSWERS
SECTION A — STRUCTURAL QUESTIONS
1. Question:
“Why is the determination of the seat of arbitration considered foundational in international arbitration?”
Answer:
The seat is the juridical home of arbitration.
It determines the procedural law, court supervision, challenge grounds, and ultimately the enforceability prospects of the award.
Counter-Argument:
“But many parties treat the seat as a mere geographical choice—does it really matter as long as the arbitration is well-run?”
Rebuttal:
Poorly chosen seats often turn into litigation magnets.
A single ambiguous clause can derail arbitration before it begins.
London vs Dubai vs DIFC vs Singapore is not a matter of geography-it is a matter of legal climate, judicial philosophy, and enforcement reliability.
2. Question:
“Is party autonomy always respected, or do tribunals and courts often rewrite the intention of the parties?”
Counter-Argument:
“In some cases courts seem to override what the parties wrote.”
Response:
Courts do not rewrite party autonomy—they rescue it.
When a clause is pathological, incomplete, or self-contradictory, judicial interpretation is necessary to protect enforceability.
Cases like Shashoua v Sharma, Enka v Chubb, and BNA v BNB demonstrate a consistent judicial philosophy:
Preserve the arbitration, not destroy it.
SECTION B — COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS
3. Question:
“How do the UK, Singapore, and the GCC jurisdictions differ in determining the seat?”
Provide a crisp, structured response:
- UK: Party autonomy and judicial clarity
- Singapore: Model Law uniformity and strong interpretation
- UAE: Three parallel systems-risk of confusion
- Qatar: Model Law adoption-predictable
- Saudi Arabia: Transforming into a modern arbitral hub with new 2023 & 2025 laws
Counter-Argument:
“But aren’t multiple systems like DIFC and ADGM an advantage—a form of legal competition?”
Response:
Competition strengthens arbitration, but confusion weakens it.
The challenge is lack of understanding among counsel:
“Dubai” is not necessarily DIFC; “ADGM” is not “Abu Dhabi.”
Educated drafting converts diversity into advantage.
4. Question:
“Saudi Arabia’s new 2025 Draft Arbitration Law: Progress or careful evolution?”
Counter-Argument:
“It still lacks the maturity of Singapore or London.”
Response:
Maturity develops through usage.
In just five years, SCCA has delivered institutional discipline comparable to major global centres.
Saudi Arabia is not merely copying-it is calibrating its law to regional commercial realities:
- Increased autonomy
- Reduced court intervention
- Clear recognition of institutional powers
SECTION C — PROBLEM-FOCUSED QUESTIONS
5. Question:
“What are the most common drafting mistakes you see regarding the seat?”
Counter-Argument:
“Isn’t this mostly the fault of poor templates or rushed negotiations?”
Response:
Templates don’t fail-lawyers do.
The biggest errors include:
- Using “venue” instead of “seat”
- Naming two incompatible jurisdictions
- Leaving seat “to be mutually agreed later”
- Mixing foreign institutional rules with local seats
- Using outdated “copy-paste” clauses
Strategic Line:
Bad drafting is the single biggest threat to arbitration before it even begins.
6. Question:
“How serious is the problem of seat versus venue confusion?”
Counter-Argument:
“But isn’t this just semantics?”
Response:
In arbitration, semantics is sovereignty.
When courts interpret “arbitration in Dubai” versus “DIFC seat,” millions of dollars may hinge on one misplaced word.
The distinction can determine:
- which court grants interim relief
- which court sets aside an award
- which law governs the procedure
It is not semantics-it is fate.
SECTION D — JUDICIAL & INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
7. Question:
“Some courts in the Middle East still interfere more actively than Model Law jurisdictions. Is this improving?”
Counter-Argument:
“Aren’t regional courts still unpredictable on public policy?”
Your Response:
Change is happening-particularly in Qatar, DIFC, and Saudi Arabia.
However, public policy remains the wild card in enforcement.
The safest remedy is not court reform alone, but legislative clarity, judicial training, and specialised arbitration benches-as Singapore and London have successfully demonstrated.
8. Question:
“Should arbitral institutions have more power to determine the seat when parties fail to specify it?”
Anticipated Contrary View:
“That might erode party autonomy.”
Response:
Institutions do not undermine autonomy-they enforce it.
When the parties are silent, institutions prevent uncertainty.
SIAC, ICC, and SCCA already follow best practices:
- neutrality
- fairness
- procedural efficiency
A strong institution is not an enemy of autonomy-it is a guardian against chaos.
SECTION E — REFORM & FUTURE-GAZING
9. Question:
“What reforms should GCC and South Asian jurisdictions adopt to strengthen predictability in seat determination?”
Counter-Argument:
“Isn’t the current system sufficient for commercial practice?”
Response:
Current systems are functional, not flawless.
Key reforms you propose:
- Mandatory seat clause in commercial contracts
- Training of judges in international arbitration doctrines
- Model Law adoption where missing
- Clear limits on public-policy intervention
- Institutional empowerment
- Standardised seat-selection checklists
- Specialised commercial courts/arbitration divisions
These reforms turn good arbitration jurisdictions into world-class ones.
10. Question:
“Looking ahead, do you foresee a convergence of global standards in determining the seat or more regional variation?”
Counter-Argument:
“With geopolitical shifts, divergence seems more likely.”
Response:
Divergence in politics does not require divergence in arbitration.
Commerce demands predictability.
The Model Law, New York Convention, and institutional rules create natural harmonisation.
Regional variations will exist, but foundational principles-party autonomy, neutrality, enforceability, limited court intervention-will converge, not fragment.
SECTION F — A STRONG FINAL QUESTION TO CLOSE
11. Question:
“If you could give just one piece of advice to contracting parties regarding the seat, what would it be?”
Final Response:
Treat the seat as the constitution of your arbitration.
Do not leave your constitution to chance, ambiguity, or afterthought.
CONCLUSION :
As we conclude, allow me to leave you with a single truth: in international arbitration, the seat is not a point on a map-it is a legal universe. It governs your procedure, defines your protections, anchors your award, and ultimately shapes the destiny of your dispute. Choosing the seat is, in reality, choosing your court, your legal philosophy, your system of accountability, and the enforceability of your award. Such a choice must never be accidental or inherited.”
“Across the world-from London and Singapore to Dubai, Doha, and now Riyadh — the trend is unmistakable: greater clarity, stronger party autonomy, restrained judicial intervention, and empowered institutions. Our region must follow the same path, not by imitation but by insight, building systems that are predictable, principled, and internationally trusted.”
“Behind every contract are real people: investors taking risks, businesses building futures, and parties seeking justice without chaos. When parties choose their seat with intention, they choose dignity over disorder, clarity over conflict, and a future where disputes do not consume the very relationships they were meant to resolve.”
“If there is one message I hope you carry forward, it is this: the seat is the constitution — the moral centre-of your arbitration. It is more than procedure; it is a commitment to fairness, neutrality, and peace.”
“Let us draft better. Let us interpret wisely. And let us reform with courage-to build arbitration systems worthy of the trust that commerce, and humanity, place in us.”
“The seat is the soul of arbitration. Choose it with the respect it deserves.”